Norway has been a firm supporter of, and contributor to, UN peacekeeping operations. 
Introduction
Norway has contributed troops to UN peacekeeping operations since 1956, but since the mid1990s, its engagement in peace operations has mainly been through NATO. However, in 2015, Organization (UNTSO), 8 established as a military observation mission in 1948. 9 Since its inception, UNTSO has received 513 officers from Norway.
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Between 1960 and 1964, Norway contributed 1,173 troops to the UN Mission in Congo (ONUC). 11 In 1956, together with Denmark, it contributed the DANOR battalion as part of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to monitor the cessation of hostilities after the Suez Crisis, and provided a total of 11,000 troops over the next ten years. The most significant and longest contribution was to Lebanon: 22,441 troops were deployed between 1978 and 1998, in three phases. 12 From 1992 to 1995, Norway participated in UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia with 2,762 troops. 13 In total, more than Norwegian 40,000 troops have been involved in UN peacekeeping operations. 14 At the peak in the early 1990s, more than 2,000 troops were participating in UN operations.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Norway deployed around 1,000 soldiers a year to UN peace operations;
in the last ten years, this has decreased to 60-70 officers. 15 Norwegian contributions have largely been reduced to tokenism, 16 providing military staff officers and observers. This trend may have been reversed with the above-mentioned contribution of a military C-130 transport plane to MINUSMA in January 2016, in addition to staff officers. These contributions follow the deployment of a small team of intelligence analysts to the MINUSMA All Source 8 Bellamy and Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, 83. 9 From 1947 to 1953, Norway contributed around 50 000 soldiers to what was known as 'Tysklandsbrigaden' ('the Germany brigade') which was under Norwegian jurisdiction and administration but under British command (Heier, Kjølberg, Rønnfeldt eds., Norge i internasjonale operasjoner, 15) . 10 Norwegian Armed Forces, 'UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)'; see also UN, 'United Nations Truce Supervision Organization'. Norway also provided the commanding officer of UNTSO from 1963 to 1970 . 11 Norwegian Armed Forces, 'UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) '. 12 1978-1998; 2006-07; 2008-09 , see Norwegian Armed Forces, 'UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)'. See also Leraand, 'Fredsbevarende operasjoner'. 13 All data are from Norwegian Armed Forces, 'I tjeneste for Norge'. 14 Ibid. 15 Kjeksrud, 'FNs fredsbevarende operasjoner', 143. 16 Coleman, 'Token Troop Contributions'. The connection between Norwegian UN policy and the solidarity argument seems convincing.
Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU
However, a strong and reliable multilateral system has also been of national importance. Perceptions of a distinction between value-driven and interest-driven foreign policy changed during the mid-1990s, when the value-driven policy was seen as part of the interest-driven.
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One explanation for this shift was the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, resulting in a change in threat perceptions. Another related explanation concerned the 'humanitarian interventions' of the 1990s, where 'the use of military forces became a tool in the foreign-policy toolbox alongside humanitarian and development aid', although it was only with the defence plan adopted by the Norwegian Parliament in June 2001 that this shift was manifested in policy.
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In Norwegian foreign and security policy there is a strong emphasis on the need for UN mandates in order to intervene militarily, which can be traced to self-interest in a strong and 26 Bellamy and Williams, 'Explaining the National Politics', 9. 27 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'What characterizes Norway's peace and reconciliation work?'. 28 Government of Norway, Meld. St. 33 (2011 -2012 . 29 Laegreid, 'Den 'nye' utenrikspolitikken'. 30 Graeger, 'From "forces for good" to "forces for status"?'.
reliable multilateral system. However, Norway also often presents this as an engagement devoid of self-interest.
US and NATO Relations -Collective Defence
Norway's participation in UN peacekeeping operations cannot be understood in isolation from its participation in NATO operations. Norway was one of the signatory NATO states, in 1949. [2006] [2007] . See: Government of Norway, 'Kronologisk utvikling av det norske styrkebidraget i Afghanistan'. 38 Bøifot, 'Det norske militaere engasjementet i Afghanistan'; Oma, 'Small States and Burden Sharing in Allied Operations Abroad'. Norway turned down requests to contribute troops to allied operations only twice -for the US-led invasion in Iraq in 2003, due to the lack of a mandate from the UN Security Council, and a request to strengthen Norwegian contributions to ISAF in 2006, officially due to lack of available troops, but in reality due to deep internal differences in the coalition government at the time (Bjørgo, 'Fra FN til NATO'). However, in both instances Norway soon followed up with more contributions, wanting to be seen as willing to take a fair share of the burden in solidarity with Norway's allies (ibid. and onwards, which was the first dedicated intelligence unit in a UN peacekeeping mission, could be seen as a promising step forward in the same direction within a UN framework. As will be shown, Norway values highly being able to cooperate with its NATO allies also when deploying to UN peacekeeping missions.
To sum up, NATO has long represented the cornerstone of the discourse element of Norwegian strategic culture, and there is a clear correlation between Norway's interest-based policy and its NATO membership. This is not a static relationship: not only has NATO shifted focus since the end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded and the USA has changed its strategic focus, making it even more important to engage the USA directly as a strategic partner for Norway.
Priorities and Decisionmaking Process concerning Deployment
What 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence
At the outset, we assumed the MFA traditionally favours UN operations, with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) more inclined towards NATO: whereas the MFA is set up to focus its attention on situations beyond Norway's borders (foreign policy), the MoD is set up to defend the country's borders (security and defence policy). Thus we also assumed that what raises the status and prestige of Norway among partner countries and in the UN and NATO would be perceived differently within the MFA and the MoD. Further, we assumed that the principles involved regarding deployment to international operations would vary, reflecting a more selfinterested approach in the MoD and a more solidarity-oriented approach in the MFA.
In order to explore these assumptions regarding the practice dimension of the strategic culture in these ministries, we interviewed a selection of MFA and MoD civil servants. These were all persons with many years' experience in preparing background documents for the political leadership regarding decisions of deployment and participation in international operations.
The preliminary findings from our interviews indicated a lack of formal criteria on participation Secondly, we learned that there was some truth in our assumption that the MFA tends to favour UN operations, while the MoD is inclined to favour NATO operations. However, we should underline here the small number of people interviewed (only ten), so these are necessarily rough generalizations.
Third, the MFA does not appear to use more solidarity-oriented principles than spokespersons in the MoD. The criteria listed, and their prioritization, proved remarkably consistent.
According to our interviewees, the criteria (listed below as questions) are followed in practice: Several MoD respondents emphasized differences between the UN and NATO as regards command and control, and hence, also the security of own troops. In order to protect civilians, protection of own troops was a prerequisite. According to our interviewees, the UN is improving here, but it will take time to convey this message to MoD officials and armed forces with limited UN experience. One interviewee said that it might appear that Norway has lost its ability not to be in the driver's seat -a skill necessary for taking part in UN operations. This is due to attention on NATO operations and the constant focus on interoperability within NATO, especially vis-à-vis the USA.
In principle, there seems to be an understanding in the MoD that resources should be concentrated in fewer locations, whereas the MFA is more inclined to disperse resourcesindicating that representation is seen as a value in itself. This is probably related to the primary focus of the MFA being on foreign policy while the primary focus of the MoD is on security and defence policy. However, other MFA respondents stressed the importance of focusing and prioritizing Norwegian resources in general (not only military resources) to a few, selected places where Norway's contributions can make a critical difference.
Obstacles to a Return to UN Peacekeeping
During the 1990s, Norwegian participation in UN peacekeeping operations was sharply reduced, In addition, come doubts as to where Norway can still take the security guarantee for granted.
A new generation of politicians and policymakers are now dominant in the USA. They do not necessarily share common memories of Cold War conditions, and tend to redirect resources to Asia -and they are dissatisfied with the lack of burden-sharing within NATO. That is why
Norway keeps reminding NATO, and the USA in particular, how vulnerable the Northern part of the Alliance is, and that resources need to be oriented and invested towards that end. Thus, lack of resources, the traditionally low US involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, the absence of direct connection between what happens in UN operations and Norwegian security interests, as well as a continued lack of confidence, are all obstacles to greater Norwegian engagement in UN peacekeeping operations.
Opportunities for a Return to UN Peacekeeping
Refugee flows from the Sahel to the Middle East, and violent extremism on the rise in many of the same countries, provide a strong rationale for contributing capabilities to UN peacekeeping operations, as well as engaging in dialogue on how to update UN capabilities and doctrines to face these new realities. The USA has taken the lead in this process through the Leaders engineers and the C-130 transport aircraft to MINUSMA in Mali (47 troops). 50 However, the total numbers involved in these deployments were still low compared to NATO contributions over the past two decades with about 21,000 troops contributed to NATO operations and less than 2,000 troops contributed to UN peacekeeping operations.
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The trend since the mid-1990s, of providing mostly token contributions to UN peacekeeping in the form of military staff officers and observers, has provided Norway with a seat at the 
Conclusions and Options for the Future
We have sought to deconstruct the simplified dichotomy between self-interest and idealism and show how the meaning and content of these concepts can develop according to changing circumstances. We have explained how Norway's strategic culture is shaped in a dynamic interplay between strategic discourse and practice. While we note the strong correlation between the UN and solidarity-based motivations on the one hand, and NATO and motivations based on self-interest, on the other, we have also seen how a strong and predictable multilateral system is in Norway's self-interest, making the picture more nuanced. We have also seen that the concepts of solidarity and self-interest are mutually constitutive, and form the building blocks of the Norwegian strategic culture. 
